HOUSTON LOCAL RECORD
SUMMARY OF THE DAY'S EVENTS AS FOUND BY NEWS REPORTERS.
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Houston, Tex., Dec. 19, —
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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.
This morning the criminal district court convened about 9:30 o'clock and resumed consideration of the Springfield murder case. All of the attorneys having spoken except Mr. R. R. Hanney for the state, and who was to close the argument, he began his speech as soon as perfect quiet reigned. The court-room was full and Mr. Hanney surely made an able speech. He took up the facts as brought in the testimony and made it look very gloomy for the prisoner, R. T. Springfield. His speech occupied over two hours, and after he had finished Judge Cleveland read the following able charge to the jury:
State of Texas vs. R. T. Springfield, on indictment for murder. Instructions by the court to the jury.
By the law of the state murder is thus defined: Every person of sound mind and discretion who shall unlawfully kill any reasonable creature living within this state with malice or aforethought, express or implied, shall be deemed gullty of murder. Murder committed with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. Malice aforethought is the intentional and voluntary doing of an unlawful act by a person of sound memory and discretion with the intent, means and ability to accomplish the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of it, and in a manner showing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief. Malice is express where the evidence shows by the facts and circumstances before, at the time or after the killing that the slayer acts with sedate, deliberate mind and framed design to kill the person slain.
Malice is implied where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully and intentionally kills another by the use of means calculated reasonably and probably to produce death and in a manner showing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischier. The distinction between the two degrees of murder is predicated upon the difference between express and implied malice. In determining whether murder has been committed with express malice or not the important questions are: Do the external facts and circumstances at the time of the killing, before or after that time, having connection with or relative to it, furnish satisfactory evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of a sedate, deliberate mind on the part of the person killing at the time he does the act? Do they show a formed design unlawfully to take the life of the person slain? If they do the killing is of express malice and is murder of the first degree. So is implied malice the essential element of murder in the second degree. Implied malice is that which the law infers from or imputes to certain acts. Thus where the fact of an unlawful killing is established and there are no circumstances or facts in the evidence showing express malice on the one hand or any justification, excuse or mitigation on the other, the law malice and the killing is murder of the second degree. If malice be fully conceived and formed it is immaterial how long it has existed. If the jury believes from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant, R. T. Springfield, did as charged in the indictment with express malice aforethought, that is with sedate and deliberate mind and formed design to kill the said S. W. Allchin with gun or pistol in Waller county, then any you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and assess the punishment for that offense, which is death or confinement in the state penitentiary for life.
if the evidence does not satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with express malice, that is with sedate and deliberate mind and the formal design to kill said Allchin, but does satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that defendant did with malice aforethought, etc., shoot and kill the said Allchin with gun or pistol, then find the defendant guilty and assess the punishment for the offense, which is confinement in the penitentiary for any length of time not less than five years.
The jury is further instructed that all persons acting together in the commission of an offense are principal offenders.
If the jury believe beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with Jack McDade in the killing of Allchin. If he was killed and that the defendant and Jack McDade were both present acting together in concert and with like intent and condition of mind, and that they unlawfully shot and killed the said Allchin with express malice, that with sedate mind, etc., to kill him the defendant would be guilty of murder in the first degree, or if not done with express malice, as hereinafter defined, then he would be guilty of murder in the second degree, whether the alleged fatal shots were fired by defendant or Jack McDade, if so acting in concert with defendant or by both of them.
The jury are further instructed that if from the evidence they should believe there was a compact, agreement or understanding had or made between S. W. Allchin and others, including the defendants, that Allchin should not carry his Winchester gun in an other mode or manner than on horseback or in his buggy and it its scabbard, the law would give no sanction to such compact, if such there was, and if the jury should believe from the evidence that Allchin was carrying his Winchester gun otherwise than its scabbard, the mere fact, if it be a fact, that he was carrying it on horseback across his lap and not in his scabbard, would of itself neither justify, excuse or mitigate the taking of his life. The defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established to the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt, and unless the evidence so satisfies you in this case of the guilt of the defendant of murder of the first degree, you will find him not guilty; or if you believe from the evidence that defendant was first assaulted by Allchin in a manner — considering the relative condition and circumstances of the parties — to cause the defendant reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of serious bodily harm to himself, nor would he be bound to retreat in such case, and that he acted upon this apprehension in defense of himself against deceased, defendant would not be guilty of any offense, unless it appears from the evidence that the difficult was brought on by defendant or Jack McDade acting together and in concert with the defendant with the intent and purpose of killing said Allchin, in which case defendant would not be excused or justified, but responsible for his acts, as you have already been instructed. When a defendant accuses of murder seeks to justify his action on the ground of threats against him made by the person killed he is entitled to prove such threats but no threats will afford justification unless it be known that at the time of the homicide the person killed by some act then done manifested an intention to execute the threats so made. It is not practicable to fix on what the act manifesting the intention to execute his threats shall be (if threats were made), but it must be some act reasonably calculated to induce the belief that the threatened attack has been commenced, to be then immediately executed, and not a mere act of preparation to execute the threats at some other period of time, either speedy or remote.
The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and your verdict, whatever it shall be, should not be the offspring of chance or accident, but should be the result of deliberation, reason and honest judgement applied to the evidence and the result of your conclusions formed thereon, guided by the law as given to you in these instructions.
When reading of the charge by the judge was finished, the jury retired a few minutes after 12 o'clock. It was thought generally that they would remain out several hours if not make a mistrial of it, but about 1 o'clock it was announced that the jury had agreed.
Judge Cleveland was notified and took his seat, with the lawyers, Messrs. Oliver, Hanney and Pool for the state and Messrs. Hutcheson, Brown and Sears for the defense present. Judge Cook was the only absentee. The jury were ushered into the court room and their verdict was read by Judge Hy Brashear, clerk, finding murder in the second degree and assessing the punishment at twenty-five years in the penitentiary. The defendant, Springfield, took it apparently with little concern and was heard to say to a friend who expressed regret at the length of time that it made very little difference to him whether it was eight (the time given McDade) or twenty-five.
The attorneys for the defendant will file a motion for a new trial to-morrow (Friday).
"Twenty-Five Years." Galveston Daily News, Friday, Dec 20, 1889, p. 3, col. 1-2.
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